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Immigration Judge: Henry S. Dogin
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OPINION
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
I.
Petitioner, Lea Viviane Gaie, is a native and citizen of Côte d’Ivoire. On April 27,
2002, she entered the United States on a non-immigrant business visa with permission to
remain for three months. Although trained as a nurse, Gaie entered this country seeking
to purchase electronic equipment for re-sale in Côte d’Ivoire. Gaie applied for an
extension of her visa but later chose not to pursue that application and overstayed without
authorization. She conceded removability before an Immigration Judge (IJ), and applied
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for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT).
Gaie’s claims for relief from removal arise out of the recent political turmoil in
Côte d’Ivoire. This court has summarized the pertinent country conditions as follows:
In December 1999, a group of “army mutineers” loyal to
General Robert Guéi led a coup that overthrew President
Konan Bédié. In a presidential election held the following
year, the Ivorian Supreme Court disqualified all of the leading
candidates except for Guéi and Gbagbo. Although Gbagbo
won 51.9 percent of the vote, compared to Guéi's 28.7
percent, Guéi claimed victory. Guéi’s attempted power grab
triggered a popular uprising. Gbagbo was then declared the
winner of the election, but that result was contested by
followers of Alassane Dramane Ouattara, a former prime
minister. Armed clashes began in which the government
army and supporters of Gbagbo's party, the Front Populaire
Ivoirien, were allied against Ouattara supporters. In 2001 and
2002, the various factions appeared to make progress toward
reconciliation. Local elections were held without incident,
and Bédié, Ouattara, and Guéi took part in a forum of national
reconciliation. The economy seemed to be recovering, and a
government of national unity was formed.
The situation changed suddenly on September 19,
2002, when junior officers who had once been affiliated with
Guéi mutinied in three Ivorian cities: Abidjan, Korhogo, and
Bouake. . . . During the violence in Abidjan, Guéi was killed,
allegedly by government assassins. There were also killings
or attempted killings of other political leaders. The
government suppressed the mutiny in Abidjan, but the rebels
soon seized the northern half of the country. According to the
State Department’s 2003 Country Report on Côte d'Ivoire,
“[t]he failed coup attempt and ongoing rebellion quickly
escalated into the country's worst crisis since independence in
1960.” Both the rebels and the government, including the
gendarmes, committed rampant human rights abuses.
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Konan v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 497, 499 (3d Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted).
Gaie makes no claim of past persecution, but she fears returning to Côte d’Ivoire
due to the violence of September 2002 and its aftermath. Gaie asserts that General Robert
Guéi, the one-time military ruler of Côte d’Ivoire who was murdered in September 2002,
was her “uncle.” 1 General Guéi allegedly had helped Gaie by recommending her
admission to nursing school. On September 28, 2002, Gaie also learned that the father of
her two children, Jean Tise, was murdered, allegedly by “rebels” who believed that Tise
was related to General Guéi. Gaie’s mother fled to Guinea with Gaie’s two children
following the violence of September 2002 but has since returned with the children to Côte
d’Ivoire. Gaie’s father, Mathias, who is not married to Gaie’s mother, is allegedly in
hiding in the city of Abidjan. Mathias’s house was ransacked as a result of the death of
General Guéi. Gaie’s cousin, Antoinette Roberts, appeared as a witness in the hearing
before the IJ and testified to the alleged family tie to General Guéi. Gaie claims that she
fears future persecution, either by government forces or by the rebels, on account of her
familial relationship to General Guéi and because of the murder of Jean Tise.
The IJ denied Gaie’s applications for relief, noting primarily that Gaie failed to

1

Although Gaie testified that General Guéi was her “uncle,”
she explained the family relationship by noting that General Guéi
and her father were “cousins.” App. at 125, 144-45. In her asylum
application, Gaie stated, “I believe my father and Gen. Gu[é]i are
actually cousins, as relations are counted in America, but in Africa,
they would be counted as brothers, and I would be counted as his
niece.” App. at 239.
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corroborate the testimony regarding her alleged relationship to General Guéi. Among
other things, the IJ observed that Gaie’s last name is spelled G-A-I-E while the General’s
name was spelled G-U-E-I and her father Mathias’s name is spelled both G-A-I-E and GU-E-Y-E. With no documentation linking Mathias to General Guéi, the IJ was
unconvinced that the claimed relationship existed. Even assuming a relationship, the IJ
was unconvinced that Gaie would be persecuted as a result, or that Gaie’s testimony was
credible. The IJ found “inexplicable” Gaie’s failure to mention Jean Tise’s murder in her
asylum application. Gaie also failed to mention her mother’s exodus to Guinea or that her
father was in hiding. The IJ observed that Gaie has relatives in Côte d’Ivoire who remain
unharmed, and that Gaie failed to establish how and why General Guéi was killed,
thereby undermining her claim that she would be at risk.
On October 5, 2004, the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision. Gaie filed a
timely petition for review, which this court docketed as C.A. No. 04-4237. Gaie also
filed a motion to reconsider with the BIA in which she argued that the IJ failed to
consider her explanations for the omissions in her application, expected corroboration that
would have been difficult to obtain, and ignored problems in translation at the hearing.
On March 9, 2005, the BIA rejected the motion to reconsider, concluding that Gaie
sought to reiterate arguments made on her appeal. Gaie’s timely petition for review from
that order was docketed as C.A. No. 05-2121. We have consolidated the petitions for
review for disposition.
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II.
This court has jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Because the BIA affirmed
the final order of removal without any independent analysis, we review the IJ’s decision.
Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). Our review is conducted under the
deferential substantial evidence standard. Caushi v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 220, 225 (3d
Cir. 2006). We must accept the IJ’s findings as conclusive “unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);
see Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“If a reasonable fact
finder could make a particular finding on the administrative record, then the finding is
supported by substantial evidence.”).
The Attorney General may grant asylum to a “refugee,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1), a
term defined in relevant part as a person unable or unwilling to return to the country of
that person’s nationality or habitual residence because of “a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of . . . membership in a particular social group.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A). The IJ held that Gaie can be considered for asylum as a member of a
“particular social group” based on kinship to General Guéi, but denied relief because
Gaie failed to establish her membership in that social group given the absence of any
evidence to corroborate her testimony regarding the familial relationship.2

2

The BIA has interpreted “particular social group” as
including kinship ties. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239-40
(3d Cir. 1993).
6

In Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001), we held that an IJ may
require an otherwise credible alien to supply corroborating evidence, but only if it would
be reasonable to expect corroboration. An alien who fails to introduce such evidence, or
to offer a satisfactory explanation for the failure, can be held to have failed to meet the
burden of proof. Id. at 551. It is reasonable, for example, to expect the alien to
corroborate facts central to the claim and easily subject to verification. Id. at 554. Under
the REAL ID Act of 2005, “[n]o court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of
fact with respect to the availability of corroborating evidence . . . unless the court finds . .
. that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence
is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).
Gaie’s alleged familial relationship to General Guéi is the cornerstone of her
asylum claim, and we see no error in the IJ having sought reasonably available
corroboration to support Gaie’s testimony on the subject. Gaie contends that because of
the civil strife, it was unreasonable to expect family members to gather birth records or
other official documentation in Côte d’Ivoire. However, even if we assume the
impossibility of procuring government-issued documents, it was not unreasonable for the
IJ to expect corroboration in the form of affidavits from family members. The record is
clear that Gaie has remained in contact with her mother since the violence of September
2002; that she has been in contact with her father; and that she has relatives, including
two of her father’s brothers, whom she could attempt to contact in France. None of those

7

individuals produced an affidavit regarding Gaie’s alleged relationship to General Guéi.
When asked at the asylum hearing whether she had documentation to establish that her
father was related to General Guéi, Gaie responded, “No, because when I came to the
United States I did not – I was not thinking in terms of that I would be asked that.” App.
at 156. Gaie further testified that she had made no effort to get documentation from her
relatives in France. Moreover, although Gaie presented the testimony of her alleged
cousin, Antoinette Roberts, the IJ reasonably discounted that testimony because Roberts
failed to produce any documentation to establish her own identity much less the existence
of a kinship tie between Gaie and General Guéi. We find substantial evidence to support
the IJ’s finding that Gaie could have and should have produced corroborating evidence of
her alleged relationship to General Guéi.
Additionally, the IJ questioned the truthfulness of Gaie’s testimony given the
various omissions of relevant evidence from her asylum application. The IJ noted, inter
alia, that Gaie failed to mention in her application the murder of Jean Tise – an event
upon which Gaie expressly relied at the hearing to support her claim that she fears a
return to Côte d’Ivoire. Gaie contends, as she did before the IJ, that she honestly believed
that Tise was not a “family member” and that information about his death was nonresponsive to the question posed in the asylum application. She also claims that she did
not learn that Tise was killed (as opposed to merely kidnapped) until just prior to the
asylum hearing.

8

Gaie completed her asylum application with the assistance of counsel, and the
application question at issue is broadly worded: “Have you, your family, or close friends
or colleagues ever experienced harm or mistreatment or threats in the past by anyone?”
App. at 239. Tise, as the father of Gaie’s two children, certainly fits within the class of
people contemplated by the question. In addition, Gaie testified that she learned that Tise
had “disappeared” in September 2002, which was prior to her completion of the
application in December 2002. Thus, while she had not yet received confirmation that
Tise was dead (a fact she allegedly learned in June 2003), Gaie certainly could have
included information about Tise’s disappearance in her asylum application, particularly
because she claimed that the alleged mistreatment of Tise based on his perceived
relationship to General Guéi was a factor behind her fear of returning to Côte d’Ivoire.
Gaie suggests that “translation and interpretation issues” at the asylum hearing
may have limited the extent to which she was able to explain herself to the IJ. Gaie notes
that her native language is Krahn and that her interpreter for the proceedings spoke
French. Gaie seems to suggest that problems with interpretation should have compelled
the IJ, sua sponte, to postpone the proceedings until a Krahn interpreter could be
provided. This argument lacks merit. Gaie told the IJ at the outset of the hearing that she
spoke French, and when asked if she understood the French interpreter, she replied, “Yes,
we understand each other real good.” App. at 117. Gaie’s counsel raised no objection to
use of a French interpreter, and the IJ expressed no difficulty in understanding Gaie’s
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testimony. Moreover, Gaie has failed to identify where in the record there is evidence to
show that she was misunderstood or misinterpreted, and she has not explained how her
testimony would have been different were it interpreted from Krahn as opposed to
French.
In sum, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s denial of asylum.
Gaie’s claim for withholding of removal was also properly rejected, as it required an even
greater showing to warrant relief. See Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 215 (3d
Cir.1998). Gaie’s CAT claim, which required a showing that it is more likely than not
that she would be tortured upon return to Côte d’Ivoire, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(4), was
properly rejected, as Gaie predicated the claim upon her unsubstantiated relationship to
General Guéi. Moreover, Gaie has waived her CAT claim by failing to argue it in her
appellate brief. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 532 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005). Finally, we
note that Gaie makes no express argument to challenge the BIA’s denial of her motion to
reconsider, and thus we deem that issue waived, as well.
III.
For the reasons stated, we will deny the petitions for review.

